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Abstract: Using a large plant level data set, this paper carries out an econometric analysis of the
environmental performance of multinational rms in the gold mining industry worldwide. The aim of
the analysis is to determine if, by looking at the actual environmental performance of rms (as opposed
to inferring such behavior from location decisions), we can shed any light on important questions in the
literature on rm location decisions: Do pollution havens exist in the gold mining industry? Do foreign
controlled gold mines perform environmentally worse or better than their domestic counterparts? We
develop di¤erent ways of measuring environmental performance within the context of a Bayesian
stochastic production frontier approach. In particular, we derive di¤erent ways of measuring technical
and environmental e¢ ciency. When we implement these methods in our empirical work, we nd
that results are robust across di¤erent models and ways of measuring e¢ ciency. We nd that gold
mines exhibit a wide range of environmental e¢ ciencies; some are clearly more e¢ cient than others,
in other words. However, and most importantly for our questions, we nd that this variation in
e¢ ciencies cannot be systematically related to mine characteristics such as whether they are foreign
or domestically controlled or whether they are located in developed or developing countries.
Keywords: Bayesian stochastic frontier analysis; e¢ ciency; environmental regulations and plant
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This paper attempts to shed light on important economic and environmental policy questions
as: Do rms operating in developing countries behave di¤erently from those operating in developed
countries? Do foreign controlled rms exhibit di¤erent environmental performance from domestically
controlled ones?
The answers to these questions have immense economic, welfare and environmental implications
for rich and poor countries alike. In this paper, we address these questions using a new data set of
gold mines worldwide. From a rm decision and environmental perspective, the gold mining industry
provides an important case study for analysis of these questions: a) It is truly global in the extent of
its reach. b) It produces substantial environmental pollution and degradation in comparison to other
types of economic activity. Recently, there has been much public concern over and media interest in the
environmental costs of gold production, especially in the developing world. For example, the New York
Times has recently run a series of articles on the environmental and social impacts of multinational
gold mining rms (see New York Times 2006a,b; 2005a,b,c). It alleges that many rms  a large
number of them Fortune 500 rms are breaching national environmental regulations, causing serious
pollution and environmental degradation in the process. These claims have been vigorously denied by
the companies themselves. In response to the accusations, the worlds largest gold producer, the US
multinational rm, Newmont, declared angrily that it "regards American environmental standards as
its measures overseas" (New York Times 2004). In addition, a large academic literature (discussed in
the next section) exists which is concerned with the general issue of the environmental performance
of rms in poor countries and, in particular, with whether environmental regulation inuences rm
location decisions.
From an econometric point of view, gold mining is also an ideal industry in which to investigate
these issues. There are hundreds of gold mines located throughout the world, in countries as diverse
in income and environmental standards as the USA and Gabon. In any country, mines can also either
be foreign or domestic controlled and owned. All produce the same type of waste and roughly follow
the same sequence of steps to do so. Thus, there are enough established gold mines in operation today
across a wide range of countries to provide meaningful statistical comparisons. Despite the potential
of the gold industry to shed light on the nature of rm location decisions, to our knowledge, there
have been no papers that address issues of environmental performance within the mining industry on
a global level. No doubt this is due to the shortage of adequate data on the activities of multinationals
at a su¢ cient level of disaggregation to carry out a meaningful analysis. The plant level data set we
construct in this paper, one that involves the activities of 419 mines over a ten year period, enables
us to surmount many of these data problems to a great extent.
In this paper, we argue that our questions of interest can be related to e¢ ciency issues. A formal
denition of environmental e¢ ciency will be provided below, but intuitively, environmental ine¢ ciency
will be associated with a mine being environmentally lax and polluting excessively (relative to other
comparable mines). This focus on e¢ ciency motivates our econometric specications based on sto-
chastic frontier models. However, we have to move beyond the standard stochastic frontier approach
to e¢ ciency analysis with a single output. That is, in our case, mines are producing an undesirable
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output, waste pollution. Furthermore, gold mining may also involve the production of other metals,
such as silver and copper. Hence our model must allow for the production of multiple outputs. The
stochastic frontier literature has not settled on a standard single approach for dealing with production
when there are multiple outputs and some are undesirable. For this reason we dene a variety of
specications for the production frontier.
Related to the issue of undesirable outputs is the question of how to dene environmental e¢ -
ciency. This issue leads us to a consideration of various ways of dening environmental ine¢ ciency
relative to a frontier. We subsequently implement these di¤erent specications and e¢ ciency de-
nitions in our empirical work. We nd that our basic results are robust across all specications of
the frontier and ways of measuring environmental e¢ ciency. We nd that the gold mines do vary
widely in terms of their environmental e¢ ciency; some are clearly much more e¢ cient than others.
However, and most importantly for addressing our environmental questions of interest, we nd that
this variation in e¢ ciencies cannot be systematically related to mine characteristics such as whether
a mine is foreign or domestically owned or whether it is located in a rich or a poor country.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides further motivation for the nature
of our study in the context of a review of key papers in the relevant literature. Section 3 provides a
discussion of e¢ ciency measurement with multiple (possibly undesirable) outputs. Section 4 provides
a comprehensive description of our data set and discusses data issues. Section 5 presents our empirical
results and Section 6 concludes.
Motivation and Literature Review
Recently, there has been much academic debate over the role of environmental regulations as determi-
nants of rm location decisions. Economic theorists have predicted that as poor countries increasingly
integrate into the global economy, their comparatively weak environmental regulations will lead them
to become destinations of choice for polluting industries, or "pollution havens". Anxious to cut costs
in a globally competitive world, foreign rms, they argue, will be attracted to poor countries, where
environmental standards are weaker and compliance costs are considerably lower than at home. How-
ever, over time, developed countries in turn will be forced to progressively weaken their environmental
standards in an attempt to reverse the ow of outward investment to poor countries. The end result
will be a "race-to-the bottom", with the most polluting country setting the global standard of envi-
ronmental quality to which all countries eventually gravitate. A closely related body of literature, the
"regulatory chill" literature suggests that while environmental stringency does not lead foreign rms to
migrate to countries with lax environmental standards, competitive pressures can nevertheless a¤ect
environmental decision-making in host countries, preventing the latter from enacting stricter environ-
mental standards for fear of losing their competitive edge (Esty and Geradin 2001; Nordström and
Vaughan 1999). This literature argues that, while lax environmental regulations may not be driving
foreigners to set up operations abroad, they may indirectly be inuencing the climate of policymaking
in poor countries in a way that leads to no appreciable rise in standards (Zarsky 1997; Neumayer
2
2001).
In contrast to the theoretical literature (see, e.g. Baumol and Oates 1988), empirical studies have
found mixed and largely weak support for the existence of pollution havens. For example, Bartik
(1998) nds that environmental stringency (measured using variables such as state spending on air
and water quality control, allowed particulate emissions on industrial boilers, and average costs of
compliance) had only small and insignicant impacts on locational decisions of US Fortune 500 branch
plants. Levinson (1996) nds similarly weak support in his study of the inuence of state environmental
regulations on rm location decisions in the US. Only one indicator an index measure of the strength
of state environmental regulations was consistently signicant but the magnitude of its coe¢ cient
was small and economically had little signicance. McConnell and Schwab (1990) and Friedman et
al. (1992) also nd little support for the claim that environmental stringency may have determined
the location decisions of foreign investment in new manufacturing branch plants between 1977 and
1988. Using pollution abatement expenditures per state gross product originating in manufacturing
industries, Friedman et al. 1992 nd that only if Japanese branch plants are included is environmental
stringency signicant and negative, indicating that Japanese MNCs (multinational corporations) did
not tend to set up in states where pollution control costs were high. However, this nding did not hold
when only European MNCs were considered. Once again, the impact of environmental stringency was
quite small.
Similar ndings derive from macro level studies examining the relationship between imports, ex-
ports and the consumption of dirty vs. clean industries. In their classical study, Grossman and
Krueger (1993) nd no evidence to suggest that higher pollution abatement costs in the US had a
signicant impact on imports from Mexico or from maquiladora sectors in particular. Birdsall and
Wheeler (1993) nd similar results in their study of Latin America, arguing that closed economies are
more likely to favor pollution intensive industries, while openness actually encourages cleaner industry
through the importation of developed-country pollution standards. In contrast, Low and Yeats (1992)
do nd some evidence of an association between the rise in environmental control costs in developed
countries and the creation of pollution havens in poor countries.
More recent evidence (both macro and micro) reveals much the same mixed but generally weak
support for the pollution haven hypothesis, although ndings of later studies tend to be more signif-
icant than earlier ones. Becker and Henderson (2000), for example, nd that air quality regulations
signicantly reduce the number of new rm births in US counties in non-attainment of federal air
pollution standards, especially in the later years of the attainment period. Findings hold for di¤erent
types of rms, not just large ones, with corporate rms being more inuenced by non-attainment sta-
tus than large rms. In their study of pollution abatement costs and foreign direct investment ows
into US states, Keller and Levinson (2002) nd some evidence to suggest that abatement costs may
have a small deterrent e¤ect on foreign investment, particularly in pollution-intensive industries (e.g.
chemicals). The measured e¤ect, however, is very small: A doubling of their cost index is associated
with FDI decreases of less than 10%. Unlike other studies, they adjust for industrial composition for
each state to account for the uneven nature of industrial composition among states (i.e. some states
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have cleaner industrial compositions than others and thus may by their very nature attract less FDI).
However, several recent studies for the US that endogenize local environmental regulations nd that
pollution-intensive plants respond adversely to stringent environmental regulations (List and Co 2000;
List et al. 2003; Greenstone 2002). For example, List and Co (2000) nd a strong determinative role
for environmental regulations among foreign rm location decisions in the US states for 1986-1993.
This result holds for all their measures of environmental stringency, even after controlling for pollution
intensive vs. non-intensive pollution industries.
In contrast to these US studies, Eskeland and Harrison (2003) nd that abatement costs are not
a signicant determinant of the distribution of foreign investment in Mexico, Venezuela, or Cote
dIvoire. They nd that foreign FDI ows are associated with less energy use, the studys measure
of pollution intensity. Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2004) in a study of foreign equity joint ventures
in China between 1993-1996, nd that Chinese-sourced investments are deterred by areas with more
stringent pollution regulations. In contrast, equity joint ventures from both Chinese and non-Chinese
sources were attracted to areas with more stringent regulations, particularly the latter. This result held
irrespective of pollution intensity of industry. Their work stresses the importance of accounting for
rm heterogeneity in studies of FDI and environmental stringency. In contrast, Smarzynksa and Wei
(2001), in their study of the investment choices of multinational rms in the former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, nd little evidence that weak environmental regulations attract foreign investment
or that lower standards are a prominent pull factor in pollution-intensive FDI ows. Unlike other
studies, they control for the problem of corruption in environmental laxity.
The above brief review brings to light a number of empirical shortfalls that may explain the mixed
and generally weak statistical ndings of the literature. These shortfalls can be summarized thus:
a) The vast majority of studies focus on manufacturing rather than extractive resource industries.
For the most part, natural resource extraction and associated production processes are large-scale
operations, with high energy and environmental costs per output. These costs are typically far greater
than in manufacturing industries. One good example is the mining of minerals and metals. Not only is
mining a highly pollution intensive activity even when the most modern and sophisticated extraction
methods are used, its impacts on the environment are both immense and pervasive. Given that per
unit abatement and clean-up costs will typically be much higher than for manufacturing industries,
environmental stringency may potentially be a more signicant factor in rm location decisions in
an extractive industry such as mining. Moreover, for many poor countries, extractive industries like
mining are the main source of foreign exchange revenues. Many poor countries rich in metals and
minerals resources compete aggressively for foreign capital by providing favourable tax and other
investment incentives for investors. Substantial investment is necessary for the development of even
one mine, as mining is a highly capital intensive enterprise. Despite its economic importance for
developing countries and its potentially huge environmental impacts, the mining industry has not
been systematically studied in the rm location literature.
b) If environmental stringency really does not gure prominently in the location decisions of rms
as some of the literature suggests, it may be because multinational manufacturing companies oper-
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ating overseas have already adopted the newer, cleaner, and superior environmental technologies of
their rich world, home markets. The obverse of the pollution haven hypothesis, the "pollution halo"
hypothesis, argues that foreign rms are induced to respond in this fashion due to their sensitivity
to the "green" demands of shareholders and consumers (Zarsky 1999). However, while this may be
the case for the manufacturing industries, the nature of extractive industries makes it less likely that
shareholders or consumers will have information on these environmental impacts. To begin with, the
extraction of minerals from the earth is the rst of many stages in the life cycle of a manufactured
consumer product. The environmental impacts of extractive industries may not gure as prominently
in consumer and/or shareholdersminds as the tangible products created from the raw materials. Sec-
ond, because extractive industries, particularly mining, are often carried out in remote, depopulated
regions, environmental information is often di¢ cult to obtain because monitoring of plant behaviour
is sporadic or non-existent. Thus, extractive industries may not be under the same kind of pressure
as manufacturing industries to adopt to higher environmental standards.
c) Misspecication arising from the use of aggregate and limited data sets. Due to data restrictions,
empirical studies must overwhelmingly rely on aggregate data, at best rm or industry level data (i.e.
not plant level data). Moreover, due to lack of available data, a large number of studies must focus on
just one or a few countries. Most of this research has been carried out on US or foreign rms operating
within the contiguous 48 states of the US (e.g. Becker and Henderson 2000; List and Co 2000; List
2001; McConnell and Schwab 1990). These drawbacks mean that existing studies are poor at picking
up important sources of heterogeneity in multinational rmsdecision-making and performance at the
global level. Studies also tend to su¤er from the use of poorly dened measures of pollution intensity
(e.g. national standards for lead in petrol), which may have little if any relevance for the production
processes of a particular rm. Similar misspecication problems arise when pollution intensity has to
be inferred from aggregate sector or industrial emissions data. A good example of the latter is the
World Banks sector estimates of pollution intensity, drawn from its Industrial Pollution Projection
System (IPPS). Measured as pollution per unit output and pollution per employee, these estimates
have been widely used to measure pollution loads in industrial sectors. Since they are based on a large
sample of production and data emissions of rms in the US in 1987, their application to developing
countries may be limited. They also make the questionable assumption that pollution intensities
remain xed. Hence any changes induced by trade liberalization (e.g. composition, scale or technique
e¤ects) will not be picked up in the study.
This study attempts to address these shortfalls. It uses a truly global data set, one that observes
characteristics of rms operating in a wide range of countries at di¤erent levels of development and
exhibiting di¤ering levels of environmental stringency. Our data set also allows us to compare foreign
with domestic controlled rms operating in the same country in the range of rich and poor countries
in which they are observed to operate. With this information we are able to investigate more fully
the complex relationships between country choice and environmental outcomes than current studies
do that use either rm level measures of inter or intra-country location choices or FDI ows or focus
on only one or a few poor countries.
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Moreover, in contrast to many studies that focus on environmental intentions expressed as a
location decision or investment ow, this study focuses on the actual environmental performance
of mines once rms have set up operations, both at home and abroad. This approach allows us to
measure directly what rms are "up to" from an environmental point of view rather than inferring their
environmental behavior through their location or investment choices. Moreover, by linking pollution
directly to each mine that creates it, we also avoid using aggregate or national measures of pollution
output (e.g. SO2 emissions) or de jure statutory indices of environmental performance (e.g. lead
content limits in gasoline) that may have little meaning for the rm. While some developing countries
have exemplary environmental regulations on their statute books, in practice, compliance is often very
weak because monitoring is lax or non-existent. While they do provide a good overall proxy for a
countrys regulatory stringency, aggregate pollution emissions for an industry do not e¤ectively link
the individual rms location decision with its environmental intentions since these kind of measures
represent a countrys total emissions.
Our context for analysis of these relationships is the industrial gold mining industry. We use a
panel data series of gold mine producers for 1996-2005. The data set provides an array of information
on the characteristics of every major player in this industry around the world. As discussed in the
introduction, we associate the performance of each mine to its environmental e¢ ciency. However,
there are some important modelling issues associated with the denition of environmental e¢ ciency
to which we now turn.
E¢ ciency Measurement with Multiple, Possibly Undesirable, Out-
puts
In this section, we briey describe some of the issues relating to e¢ ciency measurement with mul-
tiple, possibly undesirable outputs. Our goal is to provide reasonable denitions of technical and
environmental e¢ ciency. We break the discussion into two parts; the rst discusses multiple output
production where all outputs are desirable (i.e. "goods") while the second discusses the complications
caused by the addition of undesirable outputs (i.e. "bads"). Both of these issues are very important
since mines often produce many outputs (e.g. gold, silver and copper often are all produced from sim-
ilar ore). Furthermore, as discussed in the introduction, the pollution that mines produce is immense,
and is becoming an important policy issue.
Before we begin, we stress that we are considering only the case where we use data on inputs
and outputs (and geological characteristics) of mines to estimate best-practice technology. E¢ ciency
is then measured relative to this best-practice technology. That is, if mine A and B have the same
inputs and geological characteristics and are producing the same amount of bads, but mine A is
producing more good output than mine B, then we say mine A is technically more e¢ cient than mine
B. Similarly, if mine A and B have the same inputs and geological characteristics and are producing
the same amount of good outputs, but mine A is producing less pollution than mine B, then we say
mine A is environmentally more e¢ cient than mine B. We do not formally model the decision process
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of the mine nor do we address the question of whether mines are acting optimally (except in the sense
that ine¢ ciency is not optimal). Typically, investigation of the latter questions involves data on input
prices and costs which are not available in our data set. Examples of empirical mining papers which do
investigate such economic issues include, among many others: Cairns (1981); Farrow (1985); Lasserre
(1985); and Young (1992).
In this paper, we adapt an econometric approach developed in Fernández, Koop and Steel (2000,
2005) to our application. However, it is worth mentioning some alternative approaches to productiv-
ity and e¢ ciency measurement with multiple, possibly bad, outputs when only data on inputs and
outputs is available. Many papers adopt a non-econometric approach involving index number meth-
ods or data envelopment analysis. In terms of multiple output production, Caves, Christensen and
Diewert (1982) is an inuential early paper. Pittman (1983) extended their approach to the case of
undesirable outputs. Pittmans framework has been adopted or adapted in many later papers, such
as Fare, Grosskopf, Noh and Weber (2005). Tyteca (1996) provides a review of some of this literature
with a focus on the environmental e¢ ciency aspect. For many cases, such non-statistical approaches
are undoubtedly reasonable. However, in noisy data sets it might be preferable to formally model
measurement error and adopt an econometric approach (Koop, Osiewalski and Steel 1997 provides a
more detailed discussion of these issues).
There are few econometric papers relating to e¢ ciency analysis in multiple-output production
functions. As discussed in detail in Fernández, Koop and Steel (2000), a statistical model of multiple-
output production is inherently multivariate: the dependent variables are the outputs. In essence, this
means we need a multiple equation model. Since most of the previous econometric approaches in the
literature (e.g. Adams, Berger and Sickles 1999; Löthgren 1997; and Reinhard, Lovell and Thijssen
1999) involve single equation models, we do not adopt any of these approaches in the present paper.
Atkinson and Dorfman (2005) is a recent paper that uses Bayesian generalized methods of moments
in a model of multiple output production involving a single bad output.
Multiple Output Production
The best-practice technology for producing a vector of p outputs, y = (y1; ::; yp)
0, from a vector of m
inputs, x = (x1; ::; xm)
0, can be described using a transformation function:
f(y; x) = 0:
We assume this production frontier is separable. (The assumption of separability can be relaxed as
described in Fernández, Koop and Steel 2005). Thus, the transformation function has the form:
g(y) = h(x): (1)
The left and right hand sides of this equation can be interpreted as aggregate output (or, equivalently,
as dening a production possibility curve) and production frontier, respectively. (1) denes the maxi-
mum feasible output that can be achieved for given inputs. In practice, mines might not achieve this
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maximum and the deviation from this maximum is used in our e¢ ciency measures. In the following
material we will let y and x be the actual output and input choices of a mine (as opposed to the
theoretical maximum or minimum values for these variables).
There are a variety of di¤erent ways that technical e¢ ciency can be measured in this setup. The
reader is referred to Fernández, Koop and Steel (2005) for a more complete discussion of alternative
e¢ ciency measures. Here, we begin with the most common measure of e¢ ciency: radial output-
oriented technical e¢ ciency, RO. The inverse of this (i.e. 1=RO) measures the amount by which all
p outputs must be proportionally increased in order to get to the frontier. For an ine¢ cient mine we
obtain RO < 1, whereas RO = 1 corresponds to full e¢ ciency. Since g(:) determines the maximum
feasible output by a mine with inputs x, radial-oriented technical e¢ ciency is dened by:
g

y1
RO
; : : : ;
yp
RO

= h(x); (2)
where 0 < RO  1. Note that, in this setup, RO is equal to the output-distance function used by
some researchers (see, e.g., Shephard 1970 or Färe and Primont 1995).
An alternative e¢ ciency measure is radial input-oriented e¢ ciency, RI . It measures the amount by
which all inputs must be proportionately decreased to get to the frontier. That is, e¢ cient production
is dened as:
g(y1; : : : ; yp) = h (RIx1; : : : ; RIxm) ; (3)
which implicitly denes RI .
Radial-oriented e¢ ciency measures such as those given in (2) and (3) are the most popular ones.
However, as we shall discuss below, for our mining application they might not be the most appropriate.
It is also possible to dene e¢ ciency measures relating to a particular input (or output). That is,
instead of asking "by how much can all inputs be decreased proportionally without reducing existing
production levels?" one can ask "by how much can the jth input be decreased (leaving all other inputs
unchanged) without reducing existing production levels?". Analogous to (3), individual input-oriented
e¢ ciencies,  Ij for j = 1; ::;m, can be dened implicitly by noting that e¢ cient production corresponds
to:
g(y1; : : : ; yp) = h (x1; : : : ;  Ijxj ; : : : ; xm) : (4)
Individual output-oriented e¢ ciencies, Oj , can be dened through:
g(y1; : : : ;
yj
Oj
; : : : ; yp) = h (x1; : : : ; xm) : (5)
In our empirical work, we use only gold mines (i.e. mines whose main output is gold). Many of
these mines only produce gold. However, some produce other metals. Thus, it is possibly important to
consider several outputs (i.e. gold, silver and copper) in the production possibility curve. Since these
are predominantly gold mines, a measure of gold-oriented technical e¢ ciency would be of interest, but
radially-oriented e¢ ciency measures may not be sensible. Consider, for instance, what the shape of
the production possibility curve would be if gold and copper are the two outputs, but only a few rms
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produce copper. For the mines that produce no copper, their radially-oriented e¢ ciency measures
will (sensibly) be equivalent to their gold-oriented e¢ ciency measures. However, the shape of the
production possibility curve relating to copper production will be heavily inuenced by the few rms
which do produce copper. They could easily appear very near the frontier in the copper direction
(and thus their radially-oriented e¢ ciency measure could be near one) even if they are ine¢ cient in
gold production. This kind of story is meant to motivate why traditional radially-oriented e¢ ciency
measures may not be of primary interest. Accordingly, in our empirical work we focus on gold-oriented
measures.
Undesirable Outputs
The literature has explored several di¤erent ways that the previous framework has been extended to
accommodate undesirable outputs. In our empirical work, we investigate di¤erent possibilities. The
simplest thing to do is to treat the bad output as an input. The justication for doing this arises
from the observation that, in many technologies, the relationship between pollution and output is very
similar to that of a regular input and output. For instance, more output can only be produced with
more labor (a conventional input) and more pollution. A few papers which adopt this approach (and
o¤er further justications for it), include: Cropper and Oates (1992); Koop (1998); Pittman (1981);
and Reinhard, Lovell and Thijssen (1999). In Atkinson and Dorfman (2005), the bad output is labelled
a "technology shifter", but enters in the same manner as an input in (1). If a bad output is treated
as an input, then a natural denition of "environmental e¢ ciency" follows immediately. That is, we
can simply use the individual input-oriented e¢ ciency (i.e.  Ij) dened by (4) corresponding to the
bad as environmental e¢ ciency.
A second way to treat the bad output is to transform it so that it can be interpreted as a good
output (see Atkinson and Dorfman 2005, for a discussion of this issue and Fernández, Koop and Steel
2005 for an application). That is, higher values of "good" outputs are desirable, but higher values of
"bad" outputs are undesirable. But if we include an inverse transformation of the bads, then they
can be interpreted as goods. For instance, if b is a bad output, we could include it in (1) by dening
a new "good" output (and label it the jth output), yj = 1b . If the bads, suitably transformed, are
included in this manner then a natural denition of "environmental e¢ ciency" can be found based
on the individual output-oriented e¢ ciency, Oj , dened by (5) associated with the transformed bad
output.1 The exact transformation required to produce "environmental e¢ ciency" from this output-
oriented e¢ ciency is given on pages 423-424 of Fernandez, Koop and Steel (2005).
Note that we have so far dened di¤erent measures of technical and environmental e¢ ciency
through equations such as (2) through (5), which specify fully e¢ cient production. However, each
denition implies a single e¢ ciency measure. Intuitively, the actual output of each mine will lie inside
the production frontier. We can measure this "deviation from frontier" using our econometric methods.
However, to associate this deviation from the frontier with an e¢ ciency measure, we have to make a
choice. For instance, if we choose to specify fully e¢ cient production using (2), then the "deviation
from frontier" is interpreted as technical e¢ ciency. If we choose (5), then the "deviation from frontier"
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is interpreted as an individual output-oriented e¢ ciency. As discussed in detail in Fernández, Koop
and Steel. (2005), this is sensible. For each observation, we can measure a "deviation from frontier"
in many di¤erent directions (e.g. in a radial sense, in a horizontal sense, a vertical sense, etc.) and,
thus, have many possible e¢ ciency denitions. But, in a given econometric model, we can only choose
one of them. Put informally, we can either measure environmental e¢ ciency or technical e¢ ciency,
but not both at the same time. Full details of our econometric methods, including the transformations
which turn the deviation from the frontier into a particular e¢ ciency denition, are given in Appendix
A.
We now have a range of di¤erent measures of technical and environmental e¢ ciency. In our
empirical work, we calculate all of these measures, reasoning that a better understanding of our data
set will be found by looking at it from several di¤erent (sensible) angles, rather than a single one.
Data
The mine-level data set for this analysis covers the years 1996 through 2005 and was derived from a
variety of sources, such as company reports, websites and other independent industry mining sources.
It has been supplemented with information and statistics from international, regional and national
mining publications. More details of the data set, much of which has been collected by an independent
mining consultancy rm, can be found in Appendix B. Table 1 in this section provides a summary of
data denitions, acronyms and measures. The database used in this study has detailed information
on a range of characteristics relating to gold mining production: metal, grade, ore production, ore
resources and reserves, mining methods, capital and labor inputs, controllership status (i.e. foreign
or domestic) and country location and income. We have observations for 2211 mine-years (i.e. 419
mines observed for up to 10 years). Note that missing data for some variables and the fact that some
mines did not open until after 1995 mean that not all mines have complete data for the entire 10 year
period. Hence our data set is an unbalanced panel.
Dependent Variables
Our main dependent variable is a measure of output: gold production (designated by the chemical
symbol AU) measured in tonnes. However, many of the mines in the sample produce other outputs
alongside gold. In this paper, we also measure outputs in mines that produce two other key metals
in addition to AU: copper (CU) and silver (AG), measured in kilotonnes and tonnes, respectively. In
addition, we also include a dependent variable measuring the yearly value of all metals, AU, AG and
CU, expressed in millions of US dollars. In some of our specications, our pollution or environmental
bad measure is a dependent variable and in others it is an explanatory variable. This measure is
discussed in detail below.
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Explanatory Variables
Most gold worldwide is mined from lode deposits (concentrated deposits contained within surrounding
rock). A very small proportion of the worlds gold is mined from placer deposits, in which gold is
contained in alluvial deposits produced from water or ice. Because they use such widely di¤erent
technologies and extraction processes in comparison to underground and open pit mines, placer mines
were excluded from the analysis. In this study, we measure environmental e¢ ciency in both open pit
and underground mines. We control for each type of mining process in the analysis.
Open pit (surface) mines usually involve extensive blasting away of vegetation, soil, and rock with
explosives to gain access to lode deposits. This type of mining also involves the construction of benches
into the walls of the mine to access ore deposits further down on the surface. Underground mining,
in contrast, requires that a shaft be sunk into the ground to reach the ore body, which is accessed
by "drifts" (passages) that are cut from the shaft at di¤erent depths. In our sample, 218 mines are
underground (UNDERGROUND) and 201 are open mines (OPENPIT). We adjust for each type of
mine operation in the analysis by including OPENPIT as an explanatory variable and interacting it
with all other explanatory variables. A few mines had both open pit and underground operations. In
these cases, the open pit operations were often a precursor stage to underground operations. Hence
we classied them as underground operations. Econometric tests indicated that this classication was
appropriate (i.e. the third dummy variable for mines with both underground and open pit operations
had a coe¢ cient which was statistically indistinguishable from the coe¢ cient on the UNDERGROUND
dummy and, accordinly, we collapsed these two categories together).
Waste pollution in a gold mining operation conventionally comprises two main types of waste:
waste rock and tailings. Waste rock is produced at the extraction stage, where the rock in which the
ore is embedded is taken from the ground. Mineral extraction from the mined rock usually involves
removing any overburden (e.g. soils, trees), and then drilling, blasting and mucking (removing) the
broken ore from the mine (EPA 1995). This stage produces a considerable amount of waste rock, as
well as overburden. In addition, it can produce a range of di¤erent waste pollutants (ground, air and
water) from the large amount of hydraulic uid, lubricants and associated chemicals (e.g. benzene)
involved in the drilling, blasting, mucking and breaking up of ore and its subsequent transport. Other
environmental impacts of the extraction stage include: deforestation and habitat loss from site prepa-
ration, blasting, and transport networks, soil erosion, dust, air and water pollution (e.g. mercury
emissions), structural damages due to vibration and settling and impacts arising from other land uses
which may be displaced by the mining operations. These impacts are hard to quantify and are not
investigated in our analysis.
The second stage, known as beneciation, involves the processing of the ore using physical and
chemical means in order to regulate its size, to remove unwanted constituents and/or improve its
quality (EPA 1995). It is this ore which is eventually processed to produce gold and tailings (unspent
and low grade ore). A number of methods are used to beneciate the ore but virtually all involve
the application of cyanide (sodium cyanide or potassium cyanide), to expose the metal values in the
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ore to the cyanide (the leaching stage). The gold is then precipitated from the solution to separate it
from the remaining chemical and ore. This unspent and economically unprotable ore is then stored
in dumps or ponds, possibly for reprocessing later. In addition to large volumes of residual and gold
metal-cyanide complexes, other waste will also be emitted at this stage, for example, heavy metals
and chemicals such as sulfuric acid, and mercury acetylene.
In gold mining, the share of the originally extracted gold ore that ends up as low grade and spent
ore (excluding overburden) is as high as 99.99%, compared to iron at 60% and Aluminium at 70%
(Gardner and Sampat 1998). Since the gold that is eventually produced comprises only a small part
of the ore (measured in mere grams per tonne) the remainder of the ore (spent ore and low grade
ore) is treated as waste or "tailings". In this study, our environmental "bad" measure is these tailings
(TAILINGS), a measure for which we have data for all mines. TAILINGS is measured in millions of
tonnes. Note that while tailings are comprised overwhelmingly of the waste geological material created
at the beneciation stage, they may, as mentioned, also contain many other pollutants (e.g. metal-
cyanide complexes). Thus, tailings waste can be thought of as an indirect measure of the potential
scale of production of these other, non-geological or chemical wastes, on the environment. That is,
while there is no direct correlation between tailings production and chemical use, in general the more
of such solid waste produced the more chemicals needed, ceteris paribus. This has particularly been
the case for the gold mining industry over the past decade or so (the period of our data set). In general,
ore grades have declined over this period, with the consequence that chemicals use has increased.2
Tailings waste comprises a widespread environmental management problem in the gold mining
industry today. Its existence also presents (as does waste rock and overburden) a large economic
burden for mines. Firms will expend considerable e¤ort in minimizing the cost of its disposal and
storage (IIED 2002). One management problem is simply where to put the sheer volume of such waste
produced (IIED 2002). Tailings are usually dumped in piles or ponds ("dams"), or in specially made
storage facilities. Backlling of waste in open cast mines is another way of dealing with the storage
problem. The impacts on the land around and beyond the site of the mining operation are directly
related to the volume of waste produced. The huge volumes of tailings that must either be stored
or disposed of has immense negative implications for plant and wildlife populations, forests, and the
amenity value of the landscape.
Tailings waste also poses signicant management problems as a pollutant, when it is stored or
disposed of in the environment. This relates to the fact that this material is often in and of itself
quite toxic, but it is also rendered further as such by its processing. For example, gold tailings often
contains high levels of dangerous substances such as heavy metals and from the processing stage, added
deadly chemicals (e.g. cyanide). These pollutants can nd their way into the air, ground and water
systems, with potentially detrimental consequences for ora and fauna. In addition, water systems
can be a¤ected simply as a result of the reduction in groundwater recharge due to increased run-o¤
from ne particles in the waste. A major concern of tailings waste is its chemical instability, leading to
transformation of its constituent components and their dispersion in the environment. For example,
since they are highly erodible in water, tailings have great potential to impact negatively on water
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supplies through the production of acids and dissolved metals. The remediation of acid drainage is a
particularly costly process for rms. Costs are compounded by the acids long-term presence in the
environment, and its serious and direct impact on waterways. Acidic water also can generate new
pollutants, such as dissolved metals (e.g. aluminium and copper). Their presence in the water can
lead to a slimy substance (ochre) that is detrimental to aquatic life.
Moreover, the transport of tailings waste to dump sites  by rail cars, trucks, conveyors, and
elevators also creates hazardous emissions and is highly energy intensive. The construction of ponds
and other forms of storage also requires immense amount of water. Dust (which can contain high
levels of toxic materials such as silica and arsenic) from the dry beaches of tailings storage facilities
is also of major concern, particularly in arid areas. In recent years, there has been a wide number of
failings in tailings storage. Some of these disasters have left huge environmental footprints. To give
but one example from our own data set: A failing in 1995 in the tailings dam at the Omai mine in
Guyana (owned by the Canadian multinational Cambior, Inc.) resulted in the release of hundreds of
millions of gallons of cyanide-laced tailings slurry into a river that feeds the countrys main waterway,
killing tens of thousands of birds and aquatic animals (UNEP 2002). (For a comprehensive list of
recent tailings storage failures see Engels 2002-2006).
We also control in the analysis for other factors that may have a potential e¤ect on output. The
location and size of gold ore deposit depends on complex geological factors, which are not distributed
uniformly in the world. Among the set of feasible locations in the world, the multinational rm will
evaluate both the geological and geotechnical characteristics of a site in order to determine the economic
feasibility of developing a mine. The initial decision to develop a mine will be inuenced greatly
by these characteristics (e.g. deposit shape and location, scale grains of the ore mineral, hardness,
impurities, steepness of open pits, stability of underground openings of the site and so forth). These
characteristics will to a large extent determine the economic feasibility of developing a mine. Among
these economically feasible possibilities, only a handful of mines will be developed at any given point
in time. Geological and geotechnical characteristics, while important from a production standpoint,
largely gure at the mine location decision and pre-operational stage. Moreover, to a certain extent,
the type of mining method adopted will indirectly reect these characteristics. Geological models of
the ore body, mineral grades and tonnages, for example, will all determine whether the mine will be
mined as open pit or underground (IIED 2002). Hence, our OPENPIT explanatory variable will partly
capture geological characteristics.
We also include the two geological characteristcs which are most important to production: RE-
SOURCES and GRADE. To a far greater degree than other geological and geotechnical factors, these
two measures will have an inuence on mine performance. That is, they will also impact on the mine
after the decision to develop it is made, at the operations stage, which is the focus of our analysis.
In this study, our variable RESOURCES measures (in units of millions of tonnes) the concentration
or occurrence of the metal in a form and quantity that there are reasonable prospects for its eventual
economic extraction. In other words, it provides a measure of the total concentration of the resource of
economic interest and includes the following categories (in order of increasing geological condence):
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inferred, indicated and measured. It also includes all probable and proven ore reserves (measured in
millions of tonnes). (A reserve represents only that part of the resource that can be protably extracted
at a given point in time, under current technical and market conditions). We use the comprehensive
"resources" measure rather than the "reserves" measure since it is the former that fully species the
method of mining adopted, and thus, the degree of waste produced and any technological and other
investments made in the mine over the years of operation. GRADE is measured as grade of gold in the
ore body (in units of grams per tonne). Grade of ore will have a direct impact on the amount of waste
produced. For example, low grade, disseminated ore bodies tend to produce more waste than higher
grade ores since they are usually mined using open pit methods. Open-pit mines generally produce
more waste than underground mines. GRADE is measured as the amount of contained gold in the ore
in grams/tonne.
We also control for mine ownership and country income level. These variables allow us to proxy
possible pollution haven behavior among the multinational rms in addition to allowing us to make
comparisons between domestic and foreign rms operating in the same country. Data for country
income levels was obtained from the World Bank 2001. Countries are classied according to World
Bank denitions of low, lower-middle, upper middle and high GNP per capita. These income categories
have been conated in a dummy variable reecting: a) low to lower-middle income ($0-$2995) and b)
upper middle to high income countries (>$2996). These country income distinctions are captured by
the dummy variable, RICH (1= rich; 0=poor). Our measure of foreign inuence relates specically
to the issue of control (as opposed to ownership); that is, to who makes decisions over production.
We measure ownership using the so-called normal method. The normal method of inferring ownership
attributes all production from the producers (mines) to controlling companies rather than to the
shareholders (equity sharemethod). For example, if a company holds 70% in a mining company and
the remaining 30% of the shares are small shareholders only, it is designated to have 100% control. If
this controller is a foreign company (i.e. has its head o¢ ce in a country outside of where it is operating),
then our variable FOREIGN assigns it a value of 1; and 0, if domestically controlled. Where there is
control by both domestic and foreign rms, the mine is classied as FOREIGN. This way of measuring
foreign inuence is realistic in that generally it is these controlling companies that make the decisions
about where to locate, what production methods to adopt, and so forth. In contrast, the owner(s) or
shareholders do not generally exert any inuence over such decisions. As an aside, we note that we
are using the familiar term "ownership" in our discussion, but it would be more formally correct to
call this "controllership".
Finally, we have not mentioned conventional inputs such as capital and labor since for many mines
data are missing and hence including them would reduce sample size. In the next section, we discuss
some results including variables for capital and labor in a subset of mines for which such data were
available. We present evidence that indicates that it is better not to include these variables (and,
thus, work with a much larger data). In this subset analysis, capital (CAPITAL) is measured in terms
of project costs, dened as the initial startup cost for the mine, in millions of US dollars. Labour
(LABOR) is measured as the number of permanent employees in each mine.
14
Empirical Results
We have shown how there are many ways of measuring e¢ ciency with multiple output production.
When some of the outputs are undesirable and we are interested in measuring both environmental and
technical e¢ ciency, the number of possible e¢ ciency measures multiplies. Hence rather than select a
single way of measuring technical and environmental e¢ ciency, we present an array of results using
di¤erent metrics. After all, an empirical result that is found repeatedly using di¤erent methods is
more believable than one found using only one. We begin with some benchmark results, obtained
from standard single-output panel data stochastic frontier models (where the bad output, TAILINGS,
is treated as an input). We then present results using the multiple-equation approach based on
Fernández, Koop and Steel (2000).
The production frontier in all of our approaches takes a translog form in the set of explanatory
variables. The set of explanatory variables always includes GRADE, RESOURCES and OPENPIT.
When environmental e¢ ciency is estimated with TAILINGS treated as an input, TAILINGS is an
explanatory variable. Based on preliminary econometric analysis, there does not seem to be evidence
of variation over time in either the production frontier or mine-specic ine¢ ciencies. Accordingly, we
do not include a time e¤ect in our model.
To address some of the key policy questions of interest in this paper, it is important to see whether
the e¢ ciencies of mines can be associated with any explanatory variables. For instance, if mines in
poor countries are less technically or environmentally e¢ cient than those in rich countries, then this
may suggest that mines are less careful about the environment in poor countries. Similarly, if foreign-
owned rms are found to be less environmentally e¢ cient than domestically-owned rms, that suggests
rich country multinationals are behaving environmentally worse than domestic rms. As described in
Appendix A, our econometric models allow for explanatory variables in the ine¢ ciency distribution.
We let wij for i = 1; ::; N and j = 1; ::;m denote the value of the jth explanatory variable for the ith
mine and allow for an intercept (i.e. wi1 = 1 for all mines). In our empirical work, all of the other
explanatory variables in the ine¢ ciency distribution are dummy variables. We allow for them to a¤ect
the mean of the ine¢ ciency distribution3 as:
 1i =
mY
j=1

wij
j ; (6)
where i is the mean of the ine¢ ciency distribution of mine i and j > 0 for j = 1; ::;m. To aid in
interpretation note that if j = 1 for j = 2; : : : ;m then this model reduces to one with no explanatory
variables in the e¢ ciency distribution (i.e.  1i = 1 which is the same for all mines). If, for instance,
wi2 equals one for foreign-owned mines (and zero for domestically-owned mines), then (6) allows for
these two types of mines to have di¤erent ine¢ ciency distributions (i.e.  1i = 12 for foreign-owned
mines and  1i = 1 for domestically-owned mines). If 2 > 1 then the mean of the ine¢ ciency
distribution is lower for foreign-owned rms. Thus, if 2 > 1, foreign-owned rms tend to be more
e¢ cient than domestically-owned ones (i.e. lower ine¢ ciency means higher e¢ ciency). We stress that
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such a nding would not imply that every foreign-owned rm is more e¢ cient than every domestically-
owned one, but rather that the former are drawing their e¢ ciencies from a distribution with a higher
mean. Overall, if 2 > 1 it will be evidence that foreign-owned rms do tend to be more e¢ cient
than domestically-owned ones. Similarly, 2 < 1 indicates that domestically-owned mines are more
e¢ cient than foreign-owned ones. If 2 = 1 foreign- and domestically-owned forms tend to have the
same e¢ ciency. This motivates an interest in the hypothesis that 2 = 1 and we can calculate the
probability that this hypothesis is true as described in Appendix A. The previous discussion relates
to 2. Similar considerations hold for j for j = 3; : : : ;m. In our empirical work, we use two dummy
explanatory variables in the ine¢ ciency distribution: FOREIGN and RICH.
Single Output Results
We begin by presenting some results using stochastic frontier models with a single output and TAIL-
INGS included as an input (and all other explanatory variables listed above). All variables (except
dummy variables) are logged in our translog specication. As noted, we consider two di¤erent possi-
bilities for the single output: the (log of) gold output (AU) and the (log of) the total value of gold,
silver and copper produced (AU, AG and CU) by each mine (measured in millions of US dollars).
Although we are mostly interested in mine e¢ ciency, it is of interest to present some results
relating to the production frontier itself (if only to establish that it is reasonable). Table 2 presents
point estimates (i.e. posterior means) and associated measures of uncertainty (i.e. posterior standard
deviations) for the coe¢ cients in our translog production frontier. Loosely speaking, the specications
in table 2 are similar to a traditional random e¤ects specication (i.e. the ine¢ ciency term plays
the role of the individual e¤ect) and the non-Bayesian reader may prefer to interpret them in this
manner (i.e. as being very similar to what the random e¤ects estimator of the translog production
frontier would produce). Note that in our discussion we will use an informal rule of thumb that says
that a posterior mean two/one standard deviations from zero indicates strong/weak evidence that the
corresponding variable has explanatory power for the dependent variable.
The point estimates in table 2 are mostly sensible. For instance, there is strong evidence that
TAILINGS is an important explanatory variable that is positively associated with output. Other
important explanatory variables include GRADE and RESOURCES. There is strong evidence that
GRADE is positively associated with output, but slightly less evidence for RESOURCES. An impor-
tant issue is whether open pit mines have a di¤erent technology than other mines. Unsurprisingly,
we are nding they do. There is only weak evidence of a direct e¤ect of OPENPIT on output. But
there is strong evidence that some of the interaction terms (e.g. TAILINGSOPENPIT) have such
an e¤ect. There is strong evidence that some of the interaction and squared terms are important
explanatory variables, indicating that a translog specication is necessary to model mining technol-
ogy. Finally, although there are some di¤erences between results obtained using gold output as the
dependent variable and those obtained using a dependent variable measured as the value of all metals,
overall the two estimated frontiers are sensible and similar.
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table 2 here
Table 3 presents results relating to j , the coe¢ cients on the explanatory variables in the ine¢ -
ciency distribution. The point estimates of the coe¢ cients on the foreign-owned and developed-country
variables are both greater than one (regardless of which dependent variable is used). This indicates
that foreign-owned and/or developed country mines do tend to be more e¢ cient than domestically-
owned and/or developing-country mines. However, the uncertainty associated with the point estimate
is large, and table 3 indicates that the probability of the coe¢ cients equalling one is quite high. Thus,
it seems that there are no systematic di¤erences in e¢ ciency across these di¤erent categories of mine.
table 3 here
For the sake of brevity, we do not produce results relating to technical (calculated using equation
2) and environmental e¢ ciency (calculated using the input-oriented e¢ ciency measure of equation 4
for the input TAILINGS) for every one of our 419 mines. As an example, let us present some results
relating to Barrick, the worlds third largest gold mining company. A large Canadian multinational,
Barrick has mines around the world, including some in rich countries (i.e. the Betze Post Gold Mine
and Meikle Gold Mines in the USA) and some in poor countries (i.e. the Porgera Gold Mine in Papua-
New Guinea and the Pierina Gold Mine in Peru). It would be interesting to see if their operations
are very di¤erent in developed and developing countries. Using our model where the value of all
metals is the dependent variable (results using gold only are similar), Table 4 presents posterior means
and standard deviations for technical and environmental e¢ ciency for four Barrick mines. Based on
an examination of point estimates, it seems that three of the mines (Pieria, Betze Post and Meikle)
have e¢ ciencies that are basically the same as one another. This holds regardless of whether we
are talking about technical or environmental e¢ ciency. The Porgera mine has slightly lower point
estimates of e¢ ciencies. However, an examination of the posterior standard deviations indicates that
the di¤erences in point estimates are very small. In short, the story coming out of table 4 is the same
as that from table 3. An examination only of point estimates indicates that mines operating in rich are
slightly more e¢ cient than those operating in poor countries, but this di¤erence is negligible relative
to the uncertainty in the point estimates (i.e. di¤erences in posterior means are very small relative to
posterior standard deviations).
table 4 here
The previous discussion suggests that we need to interpret e¢ ciency point estimates with caution,
since their posterior standard deviations can be quite large. With this warning in mind, gures 1
and 2 are histograms of the point estimates of environmental e¢ ciency for each mine for rich and
poor countries, respectively,4 using the same models as for table 4. If we simply average the point
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estimates of all mines in developed countries we obtain an average e¢ ciency of 0:68. The same number
is obtained for poor countries. On the whole, the spread of e¢ ciencies in these two gures is similar.
Rich countries have a very small number of mines that are extremely environmentally ine¢ cient (e.g.
point estimates of e¢ ciency of around 0:1) which does not occur for the developing countries. However,
poor countries have more mines that seem moderately ine¢ cient (e.g. e¢ ciencies between 0:3 and 0:4).
But, overall, gures 1 and 2 are quite similar. Using single-output stochastic frontier methods, we
consistently nd that there are no systematic di¤erences in environmental e¢ ciency between mines
operating in poor and rich countries (or between foreign and domestically-owned mines).
gures 1 & 2 here
It is also worth mentioning that we estimated these models using the same translog production
frontier described above, except that we included as inputs measures of capital (CAPITAL) and labour
(LABOR). Due to missing value problems, this massively reduced our data set to 351 observations
involving only 54 mines (as opposed to the 2211 observations on 419 mines used to produce the tables
and gures above). With a data set of this size, it is di¢ cult to obtain precise estimates of parameters
or e¢ ciencies. However, the point estimates of 2 and 3 are similar to those found above, but their
posterior standard deviations were much larger. In this and other ways, the main ndings noted
above are una¤ected by incorporating CAPITAL and LABOR as explanatory variables (i.e. there is
no evidence of any systematic di¤erences in environmental or in technical e¢ ciency between mines in
rich and poor countries or between foreign and domestically controlled mines). We take this as some
evidence that the explanatory variables listed in Table 2 are adequate to approximate the production
frontier in our data set.
Multiple Output Results
The results in the previous section are suggestive, but either ignore the multiple output nature of gold
production or impose a particular shape to the output aggregator, g (:) (i.e. by calculating the value of
metal produced we are using metal prices to construct g (:)). However, we can also estimate g (:) from
the data. This is what we do in this section. Details of the econometric methods used are provided in
Appendix A, using a constant elasticity of substitution form for g (:). Our rst set of results assumes
there are three good outputs (gold, copper and silver) and the bad output, TAILINGS, is treated as
an input. As a measure of technical e¢ ciency we use a gold-oriented measure (see equation 5 and the
discussion that follows for a motivation) and the input-oriented e¢ ciency associated with the bad as
a measure of environmental e¢ ciency (see equation 4).
For the sake of brevity, we do not provide complete results for this specication for the reason
that they are very similar to the single output results. For instance, the frontier has a similar shape
as described in table 2, and the e¢ ciencies are similar to those plotted in gures 1 and 2. As to the
issue of whether e¢ ciencies di¤er depending on whether mines are domestic/foreign-owned or are in a
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rich/poor country, we obtain the same nding as before: there do not seem to be systematic di¤erences
between these categories of mines. As evidence of this, table 5 presents estimates of the coe¢ cients in
the ine¢ ciency distribution as well as the probability that they equal one. Similar to table 3, point
estimates of the coe¢ cients on FOREIGN and RICH variables are slightly above 1 (indicating foreign-
owned and/or rich country mines are slightly more e¢ cient than others) but these point estimates are
so close to one that the hypothesis that they equal one is supported by the data. As an example of
the kinds of ndings implied by table 5, the average of the point estimates of environmental e¢ ciency
for all mines in rich countries is 0:75, but for poor countries it is 0:69. For foreign controlled and
domestically controlled mines the numbers are 0:74 and 0:73, respectively. Thus, we are nding point
estimates slightly higher in foreign controlled and/or rich country mines, but relative to posterior
standard deviations these di¤erences are small.
table 5 here
Our second set of results treats takes an inverse transformation of the bad output and treats it
as a good output (see section 2.2). Once again, the results using this specication are very similar to
those above. For the sake of brevity, we do not present results for this approach other than those in
the right-hand columns of table 5. As with all our specications, there is no evidence for our variables
FOREIGN and RICH having any explanatory power for e¢ ciency.
Conclusions
In this paper we have sought to determine whether there are any di¤erences in the environmental
performance of gold mining rms that operate in poor as opposed to rich countries. We also examined
whether foreign controlled gold mines pollute more or less than their domestic counterparts. We have
investigated these issues using Bayesian stochastic frontier methods, paying particular attention to the
multiple output nature of gold production and the fact that gold mining produces immense amounts
of waste pollution. We have presented alternative ways of measuring technical and environmental
e¢ ciency and investigated whether they can be related to mine characteristics such as whether the
mine is foreign or domestic controlled or whether it is located in a rich vs. a poor country.
This exercise was motivated by the question of whether there are pollution havens in the multi-
national gold mining industry. Rather than examine the location decisions of these multinational
rms in an attempt to infer a posteriori whether they may have gone to poor countries to avoid
high environmental compliance costs at home, we focus instead on the actual performance of indi-
vidual mines in the multinational rm once they have "set up shop". We argued that this kind of
analysis avoids potential measurement problems associated with the lack of e¤ective monitoring and
enforcement of environmental regulations in developing countries. While some poor countries have
fairly strong environmental regulations on the books, the failure to monitor rm behavior may mean
that for all intents and purposes such regulations provide no e¤ective disincentive for a rm to avoid
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locating there. Moreover, our data set allows us to measure the waste produced directly by each mine,
in the country in which it is produced. This is in opposition to studies that use disparate and largely
irrelevant (for the rm, at least) environmental regulations (e.g. lead content limits in gasoline), or
assume one aggregate measure of pollution (e.g. national SO2 emissions) reects aequately the degree
of environmental stringency facing a rm seeking to set up operations in a country.
We nd that, regardless of whether we treat our waste measure as an input or a bad output, we
obtain qualitatively similar results. Regardless of whether we use gold, the value of all metals or
estimate a multiple-output production possibility curve from the data, we obtain qualitatively similar
results. For our policy questions of interest, our key (and very robust) nding is that there is no
evidence of any systematic di¤erences in environmental or technical e¢ ciency between mines in rich
vs. poor countries or between foreign vs. domestic owned mines.
While we nd that there are no statistically signicant variations in performance between these
di¤erent categories, we caution that this may not be the case if a fuller picture of the environmental
impacts of gold mining were to be examined. Some environmental impacts were not measured directly
in this study (e.g. our tailings measure includes things like cyanide but we do not have a precise
measure of how much cyanide) but are often regulated. Others are di¢ cult to measure because they
remain unregulated do not exist. Still, for others, the nature and magnitude of their impact may
vary so greatly with the carrying and absorptive capacities of the home environment as to render a
statistical comparison meaningless. Nevertheless, the fact that there are no real appreciable di¤erences
in the environmental performance of gold mining rms operating around the world in respect to our
pollution measure (which depends to a far lesser extent on country ecology and whose volume can be
linked to environmental impact to a far greater degree than other waste pollution) suggests that there
may be environmental similarities underlying gold mining operations worldwide.
This is not to say that multinational gold mining rms are not creating substantial amounts of
waste pollution, only that they are not producing appreciably more of it in poor than in rich countries.
Indeed, they are neither appreciably underperforming or overperforming in comparison to domestic
rms. Hence the empirical evidence of this study conrms the conclusions of most other industry/rm
and plant level studies of manufacturing industries: Foreign multinationals are not ocking to poor
countries or regions due to the relative laxity of their environmental regulations.
In short, the impact of environmental regulations on rm performance in the gold mining industry
is not best described by our research as one dominated by pollution havens. Pollution and environ-
mental degradation have been a large part of the industry since its inception. These impacts continue
to be huge, in rich and poor countries alike. This, despite technical innovations that have raised pro-
ductivity and the adoption by rms of increasingly strict "rich country" environmental codes. But,
even in countries where such regulation is weak or lacking, mining companies appear to be adhering
to the strictest self-regulation as currently dened by richer country regulations. Moreover, domestic
companies appear to be emulating them, at least with respect to our measured environmental indica-
tor. Whether this standard of environmental behavior is socially optimal or not is another question.
If it is not, as many believe, then the more relevant policy question may not be whether pollution
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havens exist at all, but whether regulatory chill best describes the context in which the global mining
industry operates. In this respect, we hasten to add that we are not talking about regulatory chill
as it has been described to exist only in poor countries. Rather, we are talking about the possibility
of a "global regulatory chill", a standard of performance dened by the richest country to which all
rms are adhering worldwide. Thus, the more relevant question for regulatory policy may be: If
environmental performance can indeed be raised with the current level of technology, what aspects of
the institutional context of rich countries has prevented it from happening? The next question then
becomes: What kind of intervention will lead to a rise in environmenal performance worldwide?
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Appendix A: Econometric Methods
In this appendix, we describe our Bayesian econometric methods. Motivation for this approach is
provided in previous work (e.g. Koop, Osiewalski and Steel, 1997). Advantages include the fact that
exact nite sample properties of all features of interest can easily be obtained. For instance, Bayesian
posterior standard deviations or credible intervals (i.e. the Bayesian analogue to standard errors and
condence intervals) for mine-specic e¢ ciency are obtained immediately. Given that rm-specic ef-
ciencies can be imprecisely estimated in many empirical contexts, we argue that presenting a measure
of the uncertainty associated with an estimate of mine-specic e¢ ciency is crucial. Standard imple-
mentations of DEA or index number approaches to not provide such measures of uncertainty. More
sophisticated DEA approaches can calculate condence intervals using the asymptotically-justied
bootstrap. (See, e.g., Simar and Wilson 1998). In classical econometrics, it is also di¢ cult to calculate
condence intervals for e¢ ciencies. Horrace and Schmidt (1996) provides a discussion of various meth-
ods for constructing condence intervals for e¢ ciencies. Note that these involve strong assumptions
and treat estimates of parameters as though they are equal to true values.
The Bayesian approach begins with a likelihood function (i.e. a joint distribution for our dependent
variables). In our case, this involves specifying a distribution for the good and bad outputs, given the
inputs. This is combined with a (relatively noninformative) prior to yield a posterior. The properties
of this posterior can be analyzed using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. Since these
methods have been developed in detail in Fernández, Koop and Steel (2000; 2005), we will not provide
all the details here. Rather, in this section, we will provide an outline of the basic ideas; the reader is
referred to the previous work for full details.
In this appendix, we begin describe our econometric methods for models based on (2), (3), (4) or (5).
The basic notation we use is described in the text (e.g. around equation 1). In our mining application,
extensions of basic models of production are required since mines can be quite heterogeneous. Hence,
we add the notation z = (z1; ::; zs) to denote s di¤erent geological characteristics of the mine (e.g.
ore grades). We will let i denote the ith mine (i = 1; : : : ; N) and t denote the tth time period
(t = 1; : : : ; Ti). Note that we have an unbalanced panel and use the notation NT to denote all our
observations. The output of a particular mine at a particular point in time is a p-dimensional vector
y(i;t) = (y(i;t;1); : : : ; y(i;t;p))
0, and we assume a constant elasticity of substitution function form for
aggregate output can be expressed as:
g(y(i;t)) =
0@ pX
j=1
qj y
q
(i;t;j)
1A1=q ; (A1)
where q > 1,  = (1; : : : ; p)0 with j 2 (0; 1) for all j = 1; : : : ; p and
Pp
j=1 j = 1. For xed values
of  and q, g(y(i;t)) = constant denes a production possibility curve, i.e. a (p 1)-dimensional surface
consisting of all output vectors y(i;t) that are technologically equivalent. Note that the restriction q > 1
ensures a negative elasticity of transformation between any two outputs. The interpretation of the
parameter  in (A1) is to deal with scaling of the outputs, which is, therefore, quite separate from the
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role of elasticity of transformation q.
We model the aggregate output g(y(i;t)) using a conventional stochastic frontier specication. To
this end we dene (i;t) = log(g(y(i;t))), dene the NT -dimensional vector
 = ((1;1); (1;2); : : : ; (1;T1); : : : ; (N;TN ))
0:
The next step is to specify a functional form for the production frontier. Before we do this, we
note that the maximum possible production from a mine will depend on its inputs and its geological
characteristics and, hence, we replace (1) by
g(y) = h(x; z): (A2)
In our empirical work, we adopt a translog production frontier and, hence, the explanatory variables
in our stochastic frontier regression will consist of an intercept and all logged inputs and geological
characteristics as well as squares and cross products of these logs. That is, omitting (i; t) subscripts
on the x and z variables for notational simplicity, we let:
ln[h(x; z)] = 0 +
Pm
l=1 
x
l ln(xl) +
Pm
j=1
P
lj 
x
lj ln(xl) ln(xj)+Pm
j=1
Ps
l=1 
xz
lj ln(xj) ln(zl) +
Ps
l=1 
z
l ln(zl) +
Ps
j=1
P
lj 
z
lj ln(zl) ln(zj):
(A3)
To make the notation compact, let v(x(i;t); z(i;t)) be a k-dimensional vector containing all these
explanatory variables. In matrix notation, we can write a stochastic frontier model using the log of
aggregate output as the dependent variable:
 = V     + "; (A4)
where V = (v(x(1;1); z(1;1)); : : : ; v(x(N;TN ); z(N;TN )))
0 denotes an NT k matrix of translog explanatory
variables,  is a k vector containing all the regression coe¢ cients in (A3) and " is the conventional
Normal error which captures the fact that the frontier is not known exactly, but needs to be estimated
from the data. Formally, " follows an NT -dimensional Normal distribution with zero mean and
covariance matrix equal to 2INT .
E¢ ciency considerations arise from the fact that mines may lie below the frontier, thus leading
to a vector of deviations between (the log of) actual and maximum possible aggregate output. This
vector of deviations is labelled . It is usually reasonable to place some additional structure on
these deviations. To this end, we write   Du, where D is a xed NT M (M  NT ) matrix
and u = (z1; : : : ; zM )0. Through di¤erent choices of D, we can accommodate various amounts of
structure on the vector  of ine¢ ciencies. For instance, taking D = INT , the NT -dimensional identity
matrix, leads to an ine¢ ciency term which is specic to each di¤erent mine and time period. For a
balanced panel, choosing D = IN 
 T , where T is a T -dimensional vector of ones and 
 denotes
the Kronecker product, implies ine¢ ciency terms which are specic to each mine, but constant over
time (i.e. individual e¤ects). In our empirical section we make the latter choice for D, but with the
obvious extension to unbalanced panels.
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These assumptions lead to a key part of our likelihood function, that which relates to the aggregate
output:
p(j; u; ) = fNTN (jV   Du; 2INT ); (A5)
where fNTN (:ja;A) denotes the NT -variate Normal density function with mean a and covariance matrix
A. The model can be completed by assuming an exponential ine¢ ciency distribution. That is, each
of the elements of  has an exponential distribution with mean parameter .
For the case of a single output, (A5) is enough to specify the likelihood function and standard
Bayesian MCMC methods (e.g. Koop, Osiewalski and Steel, 1997) can be used to carry out Bayesian
estimation, inference and model comparison. However, for multiple-output production (A5) is not
enough since it is only a single equation but y(i;t) is a p-dimensional vector. That is, if we knew what
aggregate output was (i.e. if we knew what  and q were), then (A5) would dene the likelihood
function. However, we wish to estimate at  and q from the data (i.e. we wish to estimate the shape
of the production possibility curve rather than assuming a particular shape) and, hence, (A5) alone is
inadequate. To express this important concept yet another way, note that (A5) is a model for  which
merely says what production possibility curve a mine is on. It does not tell us which precise point on
the production possibility curve that the mine is operating at.
Following Fernández, Koop and Steel (2000), we complete our model by considering the distribution
of the outputs within each of the production possibility curves. A convenient way of doing this, is to
obtain a measure which can be interpreted as the share of each individual output in the aggregate:
(i;t;j) =
qjy
q
(i;t;j)Pp
l=1 
q
l y
q
(i;t;l)
; j = 1; : : : ; p; (A6)
where it can be seen that 0  (i;t;j)  1 and
Pp
j=1 (i;t;j) = 1. To complete the specication of our
likelihood, we must specify a distribution for (i;t;j). We adopt a Dirichlet (see, e.g., Poirier, 1995,
page 132) distribution which is a exible and commonly-used distribution to model random variables
which are shares.
The exact form of the likelihood function is provided in Fernández, Koop and Steel (2000) and
precise details of how Bayesian estimation and model comparison is carried out are provided there.
In particular, an MCMC algorithm is developed which provides random posterior draws from all the
parameters and for the deviation from the frontier (i.e. u or, equivalently, ).
Our models allow for explanatory variables in the ine¢ ciency distribution. We do this by extend-
ing our previous model to allow for the mean of the ine¢ ciency distribution to dependent on mine
characteristics as:
 1i =
mY
j=1

wij
j ; (A7)
where i is the mean of the ith element of  (i.e. the deviation from the frontier for mine i).We let
wij for i = 1; ::; N and j = 1; ::;m denote the value of the jth explanatory variable for the ith mine
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and allow for an intercept (i.e. wi1 = 1 for all mines). The extension of the MCMC algorithm which
allows for (A.7) is described in (A.18) of Fernández, Koop and Steel (2005). As described in the text,
the hypothesis that j = 1 is the hypothesis that the j
th explanatory variable (for j = 2; ::;m) has no
e¤ect on the ine¢ ciency distribution. The Bayes factor comparing the model with j = 1 to j 6= 1
can be obtained using the Savage-Dickey density ratio (see Koop and Steel, 2001, for details). The
probability that j = 1 can be obtained from this Bayes factor.
For all our models, we use the same proper but relatively noninformative prior hyperparameter
values described in the Appendix to Fernández, Koop and Steel (2005).
The nal step required is to link the results from our statistical model dened by (A5) and (A6),
with our various measures of e¢ ciency. That is, the statistical model specied in this section will
provide us with a posterior for the deviation from the frontier, . We then have to transform this
back to provide us with a posterior for the e¢ ciency measures dened in (2), (3), (4) and (5). These
transformations are provided in Fernández, Koop and Steel (2005). For simplicity, we drop the (i; t)
subscripts in the following equations which should denote that each individual mine in each time
period will have a particular e¢ ciency.
For radial output-oriented technical e¢ ciency, RO, we have
RO = e
  : (A8)
For radial input-oriented e¢ ciency, RI , we have:
ln(RI) =
 b+
q
b2   4Pmj=1Plj xlj
2
Pm
j=1
P
lj 
x
lj
; (A9)
where b =
Pm
l=1

xl +
Ps
j=1 
xz
jl ln (zj)

+
Pm
j=1
P
lj 
x
lj ln(xlxj) and existence of the solution requires
that b2 > 4
Pm
j=1
P
lj 
x
lj . For input l-oriented e¢ ciency, we obtain:
ln( Il) =
 el +
q
e2l   4xll
2xll
; (A10)
where el = xl +
Ps
j=1 
xz
jl ln (zj) +
P
jl 
x
jl ln(xj) +
P
jl 
x
lj ln(xj) and we need that e
2
l > 4
x
ll.
For individual output-oriented e¢ ciencies for the jth output, Oj , we have:
Oj = RO

j
 qROj + 1   qRO
1=q
; (A11)
where j is the shareof output j described in (A6).
Appendix B: Data
Main sources of information for the data set include annual reports, press releases, other company
reports and websites. This is supplemented with information and statistics from international, regional
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and national mining publications. The mine-level data for this analysis were derived from these sources
and from a private mining consultancy group, the Raw Metals Group (RMG). The database used in
this study has detailed information on a range of characteristics related to gold mining production:
metal, grades, production information (metal and ore), resources, reserves, mining methods, and
contact details for each company. All production data are at the mine level. Country characteristic
data were derived from the World Bank Development Indicators (2001). Table 1 summarizes key
characteristics of variables measured in the study:
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Figure 1: Environmental E¢ ciencies of Mines in Rich Countries
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Figure 2: Environmental E¢ ciencies of Mines in Poor Countries
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Notes
1We have one bad output and hence such a measure can be used. We note in passing that, if several bad outputs are
used, then environmental e¢ ciency can be dened as a radial concept involving only the bads.
2This is particularly the case for cyanide use. In general, lower grades of ore require higher processing rates and
therefore will use more cyanide, producing more tailings in the process. However, the relationship between cyanide use
and tailings production will also depend on other factors, for example the geochemistry of the rock, the nature of the
mining process (open pit vs. underground), the size of the mine, and so forth. Note, too, that cyanide is the only active
form of the chemical, and as a result one can have very high WAD or total cyanide levels emitted but the chemical can
nonetheless remain inactive in the environment and pose no damage to living organisms. Climate will play an important
role in this outcome. Hence with cyanide and other non-geological measures of waste, it becomes more di¢ cult to link
waste to environmental impact, or the volume of waste produced to the mines environmental performance. Simply
looking at volume of cyanide use, for instance, would not provide as meaningful an environmental bad measure as simply
using the volume of tailings produced.
3Formally, this is a specication for the mean of the distribution of the deviation from the frontier as dened in
Appendix A.
4Results for technical e¢ ciencies and for the foreign-owned/domestically owned categories show similar patterns and,
hence, are not presented for the sake of brevity.
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